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Abstract—Cryptocurrency has seen an explosive growth in
recent years, thanks to the evolvement of blockchain technol-
ogy and its economic ecosystem. Besides Bitcoin, thousands of
cryptocurrencies have been distributed on blockchains, while
hundreds of cryptocurrency exchanges are emerging to facilitate
the trading of digital assets. At the same time, it also attracts
the attentions of attackers. Fake deposit, as one of the most
representative attacks (vulnerabilities) related to exchanges and
tokens, has been frequently observed in the blockchain ecosystem,
causing large financial losses. However, besides a few security
reports, our community lacks of the understanding of this
vulnerability, for example its scale and the impacts. In this
paper, we take the first step to demystify the fake deposit
vulnerability. Based on the essential patterns we have summa-
rized, we implement DEPOSafe, an automated tool to detect
and verify (exploit) the fake deposit vulnerability in ERC-20
smart contracts. DEPOSafe incorporates several key techniques
including symbolic execution based static analysis and behavior
modeling based dynamic verification. By applying DEPOSafe to
176,000 ERC-20 smart contracts, we have identified over 7,000
vulnerable contracts that may suffer from two types of attacks.
Our findings demonstrate the urgency to identify and prevent
the fake deposit vulnerability.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the first generation blockchain platform, Bitcoin demon-
strated that it is possible to use the Internet to construct a
decentralized value-transfer system that can be shared across
the world and virtually free to use. Due to performance and
scalability issues, however, it is difficult (if not impossible)
for Bitcoin to support complex applications. To this end,
Ethereum [1] was proposed to allow users to create DApps
(Decentralized Applications) by developing smart contracts,
which have been regarded as the most creative blockchain
technique after Bitcoin.
Up to April 2020, there exist more than 25 million smart
contracts in Ethereum. However, only 0.36% of them have
released their source code according to our dataset, which
reflects the dilemma between security and privacy. Besides,
Ethereum uses Ether as its official cryptocurrency, which can
be held and transferred between accounts in the Ethereum
network. Besides Ether, Ethereum also allows users to create
and issue cryptocurrencies (tokens). To standardize the token
behaviors, Ethereum proposes a technical standard named
ERC-20 [2] to ensure the interoperability between tokens. As
a result, Ethereum has attracted lots of attention and become
*The first two authors contributed equally to this work.
one of the most representative second generation blockchain
platforms. By the end of April 2020, there are over 176,000
ERC-20 tokens on the Ethereum platform.
With the rapid development of Ethereum, cryptocurrency
exchange (exchange for short), as the third-party supporting
service, has emerged to support fiat-to-crypto and crypto-to-
crypto trades. According to their trading models, exchanges
can be categorized into two types, centralized exchange (CEX)
and decentralized exchange (DEX). CEX, as the name sug-
gests, requires a central entity as the intermediary to complete
token transfer between its users. Therefore, the trustworthiness
of the middle man plays an important role in this transaction
model. Contrary to CEX, DEX removes the entity in the
middle to store data, and performs token exchange with a
matchmaking tradeoff model [3]. Theoretically, a DEX is
composed of smart contract(s) without the need of human in-
tervention. Therefore, DEX has been developed to allow peer-
to-peer trading of cryptocurrencies without an intermediary
but solely depends on smart contracts. Such a trading model
can not only guarantee the privacy of users1, but also ensure
the behaviors of transaction strictly follow the logic encoded
in smart contracts.
Unfortunately, a number of security issues have been found
in tokens and exchanges, which attracted attacker attention
as well. First, a number of attacks targeting exchanges have
been observed in the wild [5]–[7], which caused great financial
losses. Besides, ERC-20 related bugs have been underesti-
mated by developers [8]. For example, a token may be acciden-
tally created as non-standard without fully understanding the
ERC-20 standard. As a result, the combination of the flawed
verification of exchanges and non-standard implementation
of tokens might cause severe damages.
Fake deposit is one of the most representative vulnerabilities
related to both exchanges and tokens. It is publicly well known
as it has appeared in recent security reports and news [9]–[12].
The attacks exploiting this vulnerability have remained active
for a long time, observed in Ethereum and other platforms
(e.g., USDT and EOSIO). Unlike other vulnerabilities, the fake
deposit vulnerability is conditioned by two requirements, i.e.,
the non-standard implementation of a token and the flawed
verification of an exchange. To be specific, deposit means a
1Although it is consistent with the anonymity of blockchain, abandoning
the Know Your Customer (KYC) [4] policy is still a concern.
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user transfers a certain type of token into the exchange. A
malicious user, however, could take advantage of the flaws
in smart contracts of that token and deficient exchange ver-
ification mechanism to achieve a fake deposit, in which the
amount transferred is typically too large to be affordable for
the attacker. Consequently, a malicious user can deceive the
exchange and gain huge profit with nearly no cost. To date,
the details and impact of this vulnerability have not been well
studied.
This Paper. We take the first step to demystify the fake
deposit vulnerability in Ethereum and measure the potential se-
curity impacts by analyzing a large number of Ethereum ERC-
20 smart contracts. We have analyzed over 176,000 ERC-20
contracts deployed between July 2015 to March 2020. Specif-
ically, we first characterized the vulnerability and identified
the essential patterns. We then implemented DEPOSafe, an
automated tool to identify and verify (exploit) the fake deposit
vulnerability. DEPOSafe consists of two major components.
The first component is a static detector implemented based
on Mythril [13], an open-source symbolic execution engine
towards Ethereum to efficiently perform the detection. After
that, to eliminate the false positives introduced by the static
analysis, we built a dynamic validator to emulate the behaviors
between token and exchange when users deposit tokens into
exchange, in order to confirm the existence of the fake deposit
vulnerability. To facilitate our analysis, we categorized these
attacks into two types according to the exchanges, i.e., attacks
targeting CEX as Type-I and attacks targeting DEX as Type-
II, respectively. After applying DEPOSafe to over 176,000
ERC-20 smart contracts we collected, we have identified 56
and 7,716 smart contracts that could be exploited by Type-I
and Type-II attacks, respectively. The technical details of the
flawed implementation of token and exchange are presented
in §III; the attack emulations for both types of attacks are
illustrated in §IV.
Contributions In summary, this paper makes the following
main research contributions.
• We proposed DEPOSafe, the first framework aims to 1)
identify if the smart contract is compliant with the ERC-
20 standard rules and subject to fake deposit vulnera-
bility; 2) automatically exploit vulnerable ERC-20 smart
contracts and prove the existence of loopholes.
• By applying DEPOSafe to over 176K ERC-20 smart
contracts, we have identified more than 7,000 ERC-20
smart contracts with fake deposit vulnerability, which
can be exploited by the Type-I or Type-II attacks. Our
investigation shows that the top 10 most influential but
vulnerable ERC-20 tokens account for 984 million USD
capitalization, while the affected DEXes still have mil-
lions USD volumes per day.
• We reported various findings based on the analysis of
collected data and further propose mitigating mechanisms
for this vulnerability. Moreover, the vulnerability dataset
will be released to the community to encourage further
study.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we will briefly introduce the necessary
background knowledge of Ethereum [1] to facilitate the un-
derstanding of our further analyses.
A. Ethereum Account and Transaction
In Ethereum, account is the basic unit to identify an entity
in the network. An account is identified by a fixed-length
hash-like address. Additionally, the account in Ethereum can
be divided into two types: External Owned Account (EOA)
and Contract Account. An EOA is an ordinary account who
can transfer tokens, invoke deployed smart contracts and
store received tokens. Moreover, an EOA can deploy a smart
contract into a Contract Account2. Specifically, an account can
deploy a smart contract by sending a transaction that contain
the bytecode of smart contract to address 0x0. After that, all
accounts in the Ethereum network are able to invoke the smart
contract residing in the Contract Account.
Accounts or smart contracts can interact with each other by
sending a transaction, which consists of a bunch of data that
will be parsed and executed by the target smart contract. To
be specific, the data consists of the signature of designated
function and its required arguments. Notice that, to minimize
the size of the transaction transferred, Ethereum matches func-
tions by its first four bytes of the signature that is calculated
by the Keccak256 hash function [14]. For example, the func-
tion transfer(address,uint256) will be identified by
0xa9059cbb. Once the target address successfully handles
the received transaction, the transaction will be recorded
online soon and cannot be erased or modified. However, if
something goes wrong within executing a transaction, all of the
modifications resulted from this transaction will be reverted.
B. Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)
EVM is a simple stack-based architecture, and the function
of the EVM stack is to store the results of intermittent
execution of bytecode instructions (opcodes). All the operands
of opcodes and the calculation result are pushed onto the
stack, a basic data structure in EVM. In a nutshell, EVM can
provide a runtime environment for smart contracts that have
been compiled to bytecode to be executed, manage execution
of the transaction and transit the blockchain to its new state.
Except for stack, data in EVM can also be stored in other
areas: memory, storage and calldata. To be specific, storage
is a key-value mapping that persists between function calls
and transactions. As the data in storage are recorded on the
blockchain, it charges more to create and update entities in
storage. Moreover, EVM will assign a slot ID for each variable
stored in storage to identify it. The slot ID is determined at
compilation time and strictly based on the variables order in
the contract code. In contrast, retrieving and inserting data
from memory is much more cheaper. The memory area, how-
ever, will be erased after the current transaction. Besides above
areas, calldata is used to store external calls to functions, and
it is a read-only byte-addressable space.
2A smart contract can also deploy another smart contract.
C. Smart Contract and Bytecode
A smart contract is a collection of code and data that reside
in Contract Account. They are typically written in high level
languages, such as Solidity [15]. They are used to implement
arbitrary rules as well as guarantee to produce the same result
for decentralized parties. Smart contracts exist and execute in
bytecode format, which is compiled from source code.
The Ethereum bytecode is made up of 144 opcodes [16].
Additionally, each opcode is encoded as one byte, and rep-
resented in hexadecimal format. For example, SSTORE is
encoded as 0x55 in EVM. Opcode takes zero or multiple
arguments to achieve its functionality. As we mentioned in
§I, only 0.36% of contracts have opened up the source code.
In order to cover all these contracts, we decide to implement
DEPOSafe as a bytecode-level analyzer (see Section IV).
Additionally, the bytecode of smart contract is composed
of three parts: creation code, runtime code, and swarm code.
Creation code includes constructor logic and constructor pa-
rameters of a contract. It is generated when the bytecode
is compiled and it will be executed only once at the time
of deployment. Runtime code will eventually be stored on-
chain. It details the logic and behavior of each function in
contract. However, it does not contain any of the constructor
parameters. Swarm code is a little bit different. It does not
have any practical meaning and can not be executed by EVM.
The swarm code is only a string of hash that is calculated by
metadata of current smart contract to index it in database.
1 f u n c t i o n t r a n s f e r ( address to , u i n t t o k e n s )
p u b l i c r e t u r n s ( boo l s u c c e s s ) {
2 b a l a n c e s [ msg . s e n d e r ] = s a f e S u b ( b a l a n c e s [ msg .
s e n d e r ] , t o k e n s ) ;
3 b a l a n c e s [ t o ] = safeAdd ( b a l a n c e s [ t o ] , t o k e n s ) ;
4 emi t T r a n s f e r ( msg . s ende r , to , t o k e n s ) ;
5 re turn true ; }
6
7 f u n c t i o n t r a n s f e r F r o m ( address from , address to
, u i n t t o k e n s ) p u b l i c r e t u r n s ( boo l
s u c c e s s ) {
8 / / up da t e b a l a n c e s and a l l o w a n c e s
9 emi t T r a n s f e r ( from , to , t o k e n s ) ;
10 re turn true ; }
Listing 1. Standard transfer and transferFrom in ERC-20 token
D. ERC-20 Standard
As one of the most popular and well-known techni-
cal standards in Ethereum, ERC-20 specifies six manda-
tory functions (totalSupply, balanceOf, transfer,
transferFrom, approve, and allowance) for the ben-
efit of Ethereum developers. As shown in listing 1, the
transfer uses function safeAdd and safeSub to up-
date the balance table. If the invoker does not have enough
token, they will throw exceptions and terminate the current
transaction. As for transferFrom, except for the update of
balance table, it also checks if the caller has enough allowance
to transfer such an amount of tokens. Any of these three
verification fails, the transfer will be terminated immediately.
(a) CEX
Token1 Token2
Fiat1 Fiat2
(b) DEX
Token1 Token2
Token3 Token4
MATCH! MATCH!
Fig. 1. The trading model of CEX and DEX respectively.
E. Exchange and Deposit
1) CEX: CEX is an intermediary between users in trading
process (see Fig. 1(a)). Typically, the centralized entity is man-
aged by a trustworthy organization or company. However, once
the centralized server is down or compromised, it is possible
for data breach or even financial loss for both exchange and
users. Nevertheless, CEX has its advantages: 1) it has ability
to achieve quick transactions and support multiple users at
once; 2) it supports the exchange between fiat and tokens,
or even tokens from different platforms; 3) the trading model
determines its scalability and quick response against attacks.
Depositing tokens into CEX is simple. The user invokes a
transaction with certain amount of tokens to a designated ad-
dress. After that, the CEX server will verify if the transaction
is successful and update the balance of the user in its database.
2) DEX: As depicted in Fig. 1(b), DEX, unlike CEX such
as Coinbase [17] and Binance [18], has no central entity which
is managed by a specific company or a person focusing on
making a profit. The DEXes put the control of funds and
trading back to users. In other words, DEX does not store
user assets, so neither hacker attacks nor the total collapse
of the DEX can lead to a loss of funds. To compete with the
traditional CEXes and attract users, these DEXes adopt various
business logic. For example, in EtherDelta [19], maker and
taker agree on trading off-chain and execute it on-chain, while
IDEX [20] provides real-time order book updates, which is
live on the Ethereum MainNet. Despite these diverse business
logic, DEXes share similar mechanisms, protocols and data
models, i.e., the actual trade is executed through a smart
contract on blockchain. Therefore, once the transaction is
confirmed by the miners, it is impossible to withdraw or cancel
it due to the irreversibility. Additionally, all the behaviors
through DEX strictly follow the code of its smart contract.
1 f u n c t i o n d e p o s i t T o k e n ( address token , u i n t
amount ) {
2 i f ( msg . va lue>0 | | t o k e n ==0) throw ;
3 i f ( ! Token ( t o k e n ) . t r a n s f e r F r o m ( msg . sende r ,
t h i s , amount ) ) throw ;
4 t o k e n s [ t o k e n ] [ msg . s e n d e r ] = safeAdd ( t o k e n s [
t o k e n ] [ msg . s e n d e r ] , amount ) ;
5 D e p o s i t ( token , msg . s ende r , amount , t o k e n s [
t o k e n ] [ msg . s e n d e r ] ) ;
6 }
Listing 2. DepositToken function
To trade tokens through DEX, users have to deposit tokens
into smart contract of DEX in advance. Therefore, the user
has to firstly grant the permission to DEX to make it eligible;
then the user will call the depositToken function which
is detailed in listing 2. As we can see, the depositToken
takes the token address token and deposit value amount as
arguments, then calls the transferFrom in address token
to transfer money to DEX’s address.
III. FAKE DEPOSIT VULNERABILITY
As aforementioned, the attack against fake deposit vulner-
ability depends on both entities of tokens and exchanges.
Therefore, in this section, we will detail the incorrect imple-
mentation in ERC-20 token’s smart contracts, and also the two
types of deficient verification of exchanges. The combination
of these two conditions leads to the fake deposit vulnerability.
A. Non-standard Implementation of Tokens
Though ERC-20 enforces the implementation of these in-
terfaces (see §II-D), the standard does not specify the im-
plementation details, an incorrect or improper implementation
could lead to vulnerable contracts. To be specific, the official
guideline recommends developers to throw an exception if
there are insufficient tokens in the caller’s balance to spend, as
shown at line 2-3 in listing 1. The safeAdd and safeSub
would throw an exception if the overflow happens.
1 f u n c t i o n t r a n s f e r ( address to , u i n t 2 5 6 v a l u e )
r e t u r n s ( boo l s u c c e s s ) {
2 i f ( b a l a n c e O f [ msg . s e n d e r ] >= v a l u e &&
b a l a n c e O f [ t o ] + v a l u e > b a l a n c e O f [ t o ] )
{
3 b a l a n c e O f [ msg . s e n d e r ] −= v a l u e ;
4 b a l a n c e O f [ t o ] += v a l u e ;
5 T r a n s f e r ( msg . s ende r , to , v a l u e ) ;
6 re turn true ;
7 } e l s e { re turn f a l s e ; }
8 }
Listing 3. An example of a vulnerable implementation of transfer.
However, some developers use a conditional statement to
check the caller’s balance instead of the assertion state-
ment (see listing 3). If the balance of the caller (identified
by msg.sender) is insufficient, the transfer will return
false at line 7. Unfortunately, no matter which value re-
turned , the current transaction will not be terminated. This gap
between the actual behavior and the developer’s expectation
breaks the guideline and leads to the vulnerability.
B. Flawed Verification of Exchanges
Except for the vulnerabilities that reside in the ERC-20
token smart contract, successfully exploiting the fake deposit
also relies on the implementation flaws in exchanges. There-
fore, we then introduce two types of deficiencies which lead
to the security threats of exchanges.
1) Flawed Token Verification of DEXs: After a thorough
manual inspection towards current (and past) mainstream
DEXes, we found that most of them perform deposit logic
by calling the function depositToken, which is detailed in
listing 2. As line 3 shows, the DEX invokes the traded token’s
transferFrom (or sometimes transfer) to perform de-
posit. Notice that the DEX is responsible for auditing the
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?
Stack
Memory
Storage
Detector
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Fig. 2. An overview of DEPOSafe.
token’s smart contract that is traded on its platform to ensure fi-
nancial security. However, imagine a token’s transferFrom
is encapsulated by safeTransferFrom, where it performs
security check and then invokes the real transferFrom. If
the DEX does not audit this smart contract or neglects this
unsafe implementation, there seems no security check when
DEX calls transferFrom at line 3.
2) Flawed Back-end Verification of CEXs: When user de-
posits tokens into CEXes, the depositing amount is parsed and
determined by CEX’s back-end server. However, a deficient
verification strategy may result in unexpected behaviors. To
be specific, some CEXes do only verify the status field and
_value in the input field of a transaction, which is reported
by security analysts [21]. The status indicates whether the
current transaction is terminated with nothing unusual; the
_value is the value of arguments in the transfer function.
Therefore, if a transaction is terminated by “return False;”
instead of throwing an exception, the status code will still
be 1, which means current transaction is terminated normally.
Unfortunately, some CEXes rely on such an insufficient veri-
fication to determine how many tokens are deposited.
IV. DEPOSAFE
To evaluate if a smart contract is vulnerable to the fake
deposit attack, we implemented DEPOSafe. Fig. 2 shows
the overall work process of DEPOSafe. It takes the runtime
bytecode of smart contracts with their corresponding addresses
as input, and generates a security report through a pipeline
composed of two parts: static detector and dynamic valida-
tor. Specifically, the static detector is implemented based on
Mythril [13], in which we screen out the addresses which may
be vulnerable to the fake deposit loophole. Due to the inherent
false positives of static analysis, we further implemented in
DEPOSafe a dynamic validator to verify the flagged smart
contracts are indeed vulnerable to fake deposit. The dynamic
validator takes advantage of web3 [22], which is a collection of
libraries for interacting with a local or remote Ethereum node.
We used it to interact with our local private chain provided
by ganache-cli [23], which is a customizable blockchain
emulator. We detail both components in the following.
...SLOAD x...ISZERO op(SLOAD(x),y)...
...RETURN
...RETURN
...SLOAD z...ISZERO op(SLOAD(z),y)...
...SSTORE x, op(SLOAD(x),y)SSTORE z, op(SLOAD(z),y)...RETURN
Control Flow
Graph of the
transfer
x: msg.sender
y: _value
z: _to
function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) 
returns (bool success) {
  if (balanceOf[msg.sender] >= _value && 
  balanceOf[_to] + _value > balanceOf[_to]) {
    balanceOf[msg.sender] -= _value;
    balanceOf[_to] += _value;
    Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);
    return true;
  } else { return false; }
}
Source code of
Flawed transfer
Fig. 3. The detection logic of static detector towards a flawed transfer.
A. Static Detector
To efficiently detect the fake deposit vulnerability, we
propose a static detector relying on symbolic execution to
perform the detection. The Mythril, which we relied on,
implements an EVM-like virtual machine, so it is able to
imitate the behaviors of a given smart contract on bytecode
level. Therefore, our detector firstly symbolic executes the
bytecode to traverse all the feasible paths. Meanwhile, it
records the virtual machine state (including stack, memory,
storage, etc.) after each instruction. After that, based on the
recorded information, the detector is capable of identifying
vulnerabilities.
As discussed in §III-A, to accurately detect the incorrect im-
plementation of transfer and transferFrom, we divide
the whole static analysis into three steps, including enumerat-
ing standard APIs, locating key storage, and verifying required
throw. Specifically, in the first step, we use the signature of
functions to find out if the smart contract implements any
of the six standard functions; in the second step, we use the
opcode SLOAD and SSTORE to pinpoint the storage slots of
those key arguments, i.e., balanceOf and allowance; in
the last step, we check the final opcode of relevant paths to
identify whether the exception is thrown as required by the
ERC-20 standard. The detection procedure against the flawed
transfer listed in listing 3 is shown in Fig. 3 and details
of these three steps are described in the following.
1) Enumerate Standard APIs: As the existence of
transfer and transferFrom is the prerequisite of the
fake deposit vulnerability, so firstly we check if the smart
contract is compliant with the standard ERC-20 token inter-
face [2]. In other words, the signatures of those six stan-
dard functions should be declared in the smart contract’s
bytecode. As shown in Fig. 3, after identifying the exis-
tence of transfer (including transferFrom but we use
transfer as an example here), we will generate the Control
Flow Graph (CFG) and symbolic execute each paths.
2) Locate Key Storage: If the transfer is implemented,
we then verify whether it follows the official standard, i.e.,
throw an exception if there is insufficient tokens in the
caller’s account. Similarly, we also examine the implemen-
tation of balanceOf and allowance in transferFrom
as well. Take function transfer as an example. We have to
pinpoint the storage slots used by balanceOf firstly. As the
Mythril records the virtual machine state when it executes the
opcodes of the smart contract, we extract the recorded states
of function transfer and traverse all of them to identify
the addresses from which the balanceOf is SLOAD (as
the balance table is stored in storage (see §II-B) and has to
be retrieved by instruction SLOAD in EVM). As we can see
from Fig. 3, the green block indicates where it retrieves the
balance of msg.sender, i.e., the caller. We mark the label
x as storage address. Then, we traverse the storage addresses
to examine whether any of them is treated as target address
by SSTORE (like SLOAD, EVM has to update variable in
storage by instruction SSTORE) in transfer. We can see
the yellow block which indicates the balance of msg.sender
is updated and stored in storage with label x. Therefore, the
balanceOf in transfer is updated, which could lead to
the actual change of balance data.
3) Verify Required throw: Similarly, the success of second
step is the precondition of this step. In this step, we detect if
the balanceOf is protected and properly handled. Mythril
generates all the feasible paths of the transfer function (if
it exists), so we screen out all the instructions that indicates a
normal termination of current path, i.e., STOP and RETURN,
which means these paths are not terminated by assertion. Like
the RETURN colored by green and red in Fig. 3, they all
represent the termination of that path. Then, we will traverse
these paths backward to search for the instruction ISZERO,
which is used at the comparison between values. For example,
from any of the RETURN opcode in Fig. 3, we can find a
ISZERO backward. As for the two arguments compared by
ISZERO, if one of them is the target address of SSTORE,
it means the balanceOf is protected by if-else before
updating. Hence, we treat this ISZERO as a protected node,
as the red block and purple block in Fig. 3. For all the paths
forking from the protected nodes, if none of them is terminated
by revert instructions, i.e., REVERT and ASSERT_FAIL,
we can ensure that this smart contract does not follow the
official guideline. In other words, neither of branches forked
by if-else is terminated by assertion, such that the smart
contract may be subject to to fake deposit vulnerability.
Though we have proposed a well-designed strategy to identify
the fake deposit vulnerability in ERC-20 smart contracts, we
have to face the introduced false positives due to the inherent
limitations of static analysis methods. Taking Listing 1 as an
example, the smart contact may implement security check by
safeAdd or safeSub. This may introduce false positives
to DEPOSafe. In §V-B, we comprehensively analyze all the
false positives reported by DEPOSafe. Moreover, we imple-
ment a dynamic validator after static detector. This benefits
DEPOSafe in two aspects: 1) eliminating the false positives
introduced by static analysis and increasing the precision; 2)
achieving automatic EXP generation towards fake deposit to
validate the existence of vulnerability.
B. Dynamic Validator
The strategy in our dynamic validator is to mimic the
deposit behavior between tokens and exchanges. To this end,
Fig. 4. The deployment and interaction between contracts in favor of web3.
we divide the whole validation process into three steps:
obtaining creation code, preparing deployment environment,
and verifying deposit behaviors.
1) Obtain Creation Code: As the static detector only passes
the addresses of those token smart contracts that may be
vulnerable to fake deposit behaviors, we have to firstly obtain
the creation code, which indicates the deployed contract and
the corresponding initial value of parameters (see §II-C). To do
this, we firstly implement a crawler to grab all the transactions
invoked and received from etherscan.io [24] (a well-known
and credible browser for Ethereum) according to the addresses.
Then, we only keep the oldest one, which is the contract
deployment transaction (see §II-A), to parse. Finally, we can
obtain the creation code and the initial values from the input
data field.
2) Prepare Deployment Environment: After getting the
creation code of tokens, the next step is to deploy them to
perform test. To avoid ethical and financial issues, we conduct
the testing on our private chain. To be specific, we set up a
private chain and interact with the deployed contract in favor of
ganache and web3 respectively. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 4,
the sendTransactions provided by web3 enables the
contract deployment and function invocation from us. Except
for tokens, as DEXes also perform all their functionalities in
smart contracts (see §II-E), we also deployed the DEXes in
our testing environment for the following test.
3) Verify Deposit Behaviors: As shown in Fig. 4, we use
the sendTransaction to invoke the functions in deployed
smart contracts. In sendTransaction, we can indicate the
invoker, receiver, and the specific function and its parameters
in from, to, and data respectively.
As explained in §III-B, there are two types of flawed
verification of DEX and CEX, which requires different deposit
behaviors, i.e., different testing processes. Therefore, we divide
the verifying process into two parts (as shown in Fig. 5), which
aim to verify the vulnerabilities existed in DEX and CEX.
Type-I Attack. Type-I attack is related to the DEXes. Under
normal circumstances, the depositToken in DEXes’ smart
contract would invoke the traded token’s transferFrom or
transfer. However, the mis-implementation of functions in
ERC-20 tokens would result in Type-I attack. Except for the
example raised in §III-B1, there exists some other cases. If the
smart contract does not implement the transferFrom or
transfer at all, the invocation from depositToken will

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Fig. 5. The fake deposit attack resulted from (a) the incorrect implementation
of ERC-20 token and lack of auditing from DEX; (b) the insufficient
verification of back-end server of CEX. (Where the solid line is the “Call
Flow” and the dash line is the “Money Flow”)
be automatically executed by the fallback function [25], which
will be executed if none of other functions matches to the name
indicated in the incoming function call. Consequently, some
unexpected behaviors would happen.
Accordingly, we design our verifying procedures for Type-
I attack as shown in Fig. 5(a). Notice that, we have already
deployed the smart contracts of ERC-20 and DEX before this
step starts. Firstly, we (the owner) issue the corresponding
tokens according to the ERC-20 contract. Then, the owner
transfers only 1 newly issued token to another account, i.e.,
the attacker. Next, the attacker invokes depositToken by
calling the DEX to deposit 100 tokens which is definitely
unaffordable to the attacker. If the smart contract is imple-
mented incorrectly, i.e., not following the ERC-20 guideline
like examples depicted in the last paragraph, the deposit
request will be handled. Finally, we examine the balance table
in the DEX to verify the final result of such a deposit request.
If the attacker has balance which is equal to the amount of
tokens deposited into the DEX, the Type-I fake deposit attack
is considered successful.
Type-II Attack. The Type-II attack relies on the flaws in
back-end source code of CEX, as discussed in §III-B2. Though
it is impossible for us to obtain the source code, we should
not underestimate the financial losses which may result from
this type of attack. Therefore, we just assume the CEX has
a deficiency in validating transactions and perform attacks
following the behaviors detailed in Fig. 5(b). Specifically, like
the verification of Type-I attack, we firstly issue the token
and transfer only 1 token to attacker account. Then, however,
the attacker would call the transfer function in the ERC-
20 with the _to as address of the CEX and _value as
100, which is also unaffordable to him. After that, we would
examine this transaction in our private chain to check if the
status is 1. If it is, we can assume this kind of token has
possibility to be fake deposited into some defective CEXes.
Therefore, we have measured the most worst case for the fake
deposit behavior between ERC-20 and CEX in Type-II attack.
V. EVALUATION
Our evaluation is driven by the following research questions:
RQ1 How many ERC-20 smart contracts are vulnerable to fake
deposit attacks, and can be successfully exploited? We
want to measure the overall landscape of fake deposit
vulnerability across all the ERC-20 tokens.
RQ2 How effective is DEPOSafe in identifying fake deposit
vulnerability? We want to measure the precision and
recall of DEPOSafe.
RQ3 What is the impact of the fake deposit vulnerability?
To answer RQ1, we apply the DEPOSafe to all of the 176k
ERC-20 smart contracts deployed by the time of this writing.
To evaluate the effectiveness of DEPOSafe (RQ2), we manu-
ally select samples and perform a fine-grained analysis on the
false positives and false negatives introduced by both static
detector and dynamic validator in DEPOSafe respectively. To
answer RQ3, we further analyze the transactions and volume
of these vulnerable ERC-20 tokens and corresponding DEXes,
as an indicator to measure the overall impacts.
A. RQ1: Vulnerable ERC-20 Smart Contracts
1) Overall Result: After analyzing 176,559 ERC-20 smart
contracts deployed before April 2020, 7,735 (4.38%) smart
contracts are marked as vulnerable by DEPOSafe. Among
them, 56 smart contracts are vulnerable to Type-I attack (see
§IV-B3 and Fig. 5), while 7,716 of them can be exploited by
the Type-II attack3. It suggests that fake deposit vulnerability
is prevalent in the ERC-20 smart contract ecosystem.
Note that, for the 56 smart contracts that are vulnerable
to Type-I attack, they can be indeed exploited by attackers
in the wild, due to their vulnerable implementation. For the
7,716 smart contracts that are vulnerable to Type-II attack,
whether the attacks could be successfully performed are also
relying on the verification of CEXes. As aforementioned in
§III, performing Type-II attack also requires the flawed verifi-
cation of CEXes, including lacking audit to tradable token
and deficiency in back-end verification. As we are unable
to acquire the source code of CEXes, we can only measure
the vulnerability from the perspective of smart contracts.
Nevertheless, these vulnerabilities are indeed existing, which
pose great security issues, especially when considering the
fake deposit attacks are frequently reported from time to time.
2) Distribution of the Vulnerable ERC-20 Smart Contracts:
We further analyze the distribution of these 7,735 vulnerable
smart contracts based on their deployment time. As depicted
in Fig. 6, the number of smart contracts that are vulnerable
to fake deposit vulnerability shows an increasing trend till
June 2018, which may be due to the growing popularity of
ERC-20 tokens. After that, the amount of vulnerable contracts
declined greatly. We speculate the decline is related to a mass
of attack behaviors towards Ethereum, which in turn reminds
the developers of newly deployed ERC-20 tokens.
Fig. 6 also shows the proportion of the vulnerable ERC-20
contracts within the deployed ones in each month. As we can
see, for the first month (January, 2016), all of the 5 ERC-
20 tokens are affected, which may due to the developer’s
337 smart contracts can be exploited by both types of attacks.
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Fig. 6. The distribution of ERC-20 smart contracts with fake deposit
vulnerability, and its percentage of deployed ones in each month.
unfamiliarity to ERC-20 standard. For the following four
months, all the deployed ERC-20 contracts are not vulnerable
to fake deposit vulnerability. It might be that the number of
new deployed ERC-20 contracts are small, which are between
15 to 33. From then on, the percentage fluctuated between
1% to 10%, even if the absolute number changes dramatically.
It suggests that although attacks related to this vulnerability
have been reported from time to time, there are always a
considerable number of developers who overlooked it.
B. RQ2: The Effectiveness of DEPOSafe
DEPOSafe is composed of two components: static detector
and dynamic validator. Due to the inherent limitation of static
analysis, the false positives will be introduced inevitably.
Conversely, though dynamic validator can ensure the exploited
smart contracts are really vulnerable, it will introduce false
negatives, as some vulnerable contracts cannot be easily trig-
gered. Therefore, we seek to evaluate the effectiveness of the
static detector and dynamic validator, respectively.
Specifically, the first phase of DEPOSafe (i.e., static detec-
tor) has reported 9,856 suspicious smart contracts, as they have
shown code-level patterns of the vulnerability. As DEPOSafe
only reports 7,735 vulnerable contracts after the second phase
(i.e., dynamic validator), there remains a gap of 2,121 contracts
between these two phases. Note that, there are no false
positives introduced by DEPOSafe, as all the 7,735 reported
smart contracts can be exploited successfully.
1) Manually Investigation: Next, we seek to analyze the
2,121 unreported ones, to see (1) how many of them are false
positives introduced by static detector, but later removed by
our dynamic validator, and (2) how many of them are false
negatives of DEPOSafe, which are indeed vulnerable ones
but missed by the dynamic validator. Furthermore, we also
sample smart contracts from the unreported ones in the 176K
tokens to evaluate (3) the overall coverage of DEPOSafe (as
the coverage is relying on the performance of static detector).
For the 2,121 smart contracts, 671 of them are open-source.
Thus, we decide to select contracts from open-source ones for
achieving accurate manual investigation. We firstly sorted them
by the lexicographic order based on the contracts addresses,
and then grouped them into 10 subsets (67 contracts in first
nine groups, and 68 contracts in the last one). Next, we chose
10 contracts randomly from each subset and analyzed them
(overall 100 contracts) manually (Dataset-1). Moreover, we
randomly select 100 smart contracts (with source code) from
the unreported ones in the 176K ERC-20 tokens (Dataset-2).
In total, we manually investigate 200 smart contracts.
2) Effectiveness of DEPOSafe: After two rounds of thor-
ough and careful inspections by the first two authors, we
have identified 90 false positive cases introduced by the
static detector (but eliminated by dynamic validator) and 10
false negative cases from the 100 sampled smart contracts in
Dataset-1. As to the Dataset-2, all of them are confirmed to be
true negatives (i.e., without vulnerability). This result suggests
the effectiveness of DEPOSafe, i.e., most of the vulnerable
smart contracts can be automatically exploited by DEPOSafe.
Overall, the precision of DEPOSafe is 100% (as all the
reported cases are vulnerable), and the recall of DEPOSafe
is roughly over 99%4.
3) False Positives of Static Detector: The 90 false positives
of static detector fall into three categories, including inter-
contract SafeMath (72), stringent throw check (15), and non-
standard transfer implementation (3).
Inter-Contract SafeMath. As shown in Listing 1, some
contracts implement safeAdd-like arithmetic operations in
SafeMath contract, in order to perform an overflow verifi-
cation by throwing an exception. However, the SafeMath is
often implemented in another contract, and the token contract
will inherit it and invoke the functions in it to perform
arithmetic operations. For example, the transfer in listing 1
calls two functions, i.e., safeAdd and safeSub, to prevent
overflows. Nevertheless, on the bytecode level, the opcode
sequence of safeAdd (and safeSub) can be either inlined
into the transfer function, or invoked by the opcode CALL.
In the former case, we can easily locate the revert opcode
as shown in §IV-A. However, in the latter case, because
DEPOSafe does not achieve the inter-contract symbolic ex-
ecution (due to the limitation of Mythril), we cannot locate
the revert operation and conduct the backward tracing
accordingly, which will result in false positives.
Stringent throw Check. As we mentioned in §IV-A2 and
§IV-A3, in the transfer (or transferFrom) function,
we would firstly locate the variables being updated, and
then trace backwards to verify if they are protected by the
throw statement. However, the semantic information of the
bytecode is usually insufficient. As shown in the bottom
right node in Fig. 3, we are unable to distinguish the targets
of SSTORE between msg.sender and _to. Therefore, to
guarantee the soundness of our static detector, we would check
the verification on balance table for both of them, which
inevitably introduces false positives as only the check for
balanceOf[msg.sender] is necessary.
Non-Standard transfer Implementation. Even if the
transfer function is implemented with the correct logic, it
4It is estimated based on the proportion of false negative cases in Dataset-1
and Dataset-2, as roughly 212 cases (10% * 2121) would be considered to be
false negatives, among all the 176K contracts. Precision = TP/(TP+FP) and
recall = TP/(TP+FN).
may still be implemented in a way that does not conform to
the ERC-20 specification. To be specific, as shown in listing 4,
the transfer invokes transferFrom to complete the
logic of transferring tokens. Even if such an implementation
could check the adequacy of balance of the invoker, this
would not be consistent with the specification set out in
ERC-20 guidance [2] in which it strictly limits the behaviors
of transfer, i.e., throwing an exception directly inside
transfer if there is an insufficient balance.
1 f u n c t i o n t r a n s f e r ( address d s t , u i n t v a l )
p u b l i c r e t u r n s ( boo l ) {
2 re turn t r a n s f e r F r o m ( msg . sende r , d s t , v a l ) ;
3 }
4
5 f u n c t i o n t r a n s f e r F r o m ( address s r c , address d s t
, u i n t v a l ) p u b l i c r e t u r n s ( boo l )
6 {
7 r e q u i r e ( b a l a n c e O f [ s r c ] >= v a l ) ;
8 . . .
9 }
Listing 4. An example of a mis-implementation of transfer.
4) False Negatives of DEPOSafe: We have observed two
reasons leading to the false negatives of DEPOSafe: insuffi-
cient initialization (9) and insufficient supply (1). Notice that,
all of them are related to Type-II attack (see §III-B2).
Insufficient Initialization. Our dynamic validator follows
certain attack pattern that is described in §IV-B to validate
the vulnerability. However, some tokes implement several non-
standard requirements such that they need additional initializa-
tion. For example, BigAppleToken [26], which implements all
the mandatory functions in ERC-20 interface, has one special
function as shown in listing 5.
1 boo l p u b l i c t r a n s f e r E n a b l e d ;
2 f u n c t i o n e n a b l e T r a n s f e r ( boo l e n a b l e ) e x t e r n a l
onlyOwner {
3 t r a n s f e r E n a b l e d = e n a b l e ;
4 . . . / / f o l l o w i n g l o g i c
5 }
Listing 5. The code snippet in BigAppleToken.
Apart from that, in the transfer function, there is one more
line (i.e., require(transferEnabled)) before all the
statements, which can be regarded as a switch to enable the
function. Moreover, as the function names vary, it is impossi-
ble to take every situation into consideration. Therefore, such
kind of tokens, which require additional initialization process,
cannot pass the validator.
Insufficient Supply. Under most circumstances, when the
variable totalSupply of a contract is initialized, all the
balance will be transferred to the owner’s account, i.e.,
msg.sender. However, in some cases, the initial supply is
given to a designated address, like the code snippet shown
in Listing 6. As it is impossible to assign the addresses of
new created accounts even in the testnet of Ethereum, we
cannot execute the following logic of dynamic validator unless
modifying the source code.
TABLE I
TOP 5 VULNERABLE TOKENS WITH MOST HOLDERS (TYPE-I) AND
LARGEST MARKET CAP (TYPE-II).
Type-I Type-II
Token #Holders #Txs Token Cap($) #Holders #Txs
CLB 53 62 BRC 391K 87K 1,382K
BB 50 32 BAT 388K 305K 2,054K
LOVE 49 85 HPT 63K 1K 7K
eDOGE 21 21 RPL 39K 3K 30K
EMVC 13 15 POWR 28K 50K 378K
Total(56) 258 1,178 Total(7,716) 1.1B 695K 4.6M
1 address p u b l i c f o u n d e r = 0xCB7E . . . ; / / a f i x e d
a d d r e s s
2 b a l a n c e s [ f o u n d e r ] = t o t a l S u p p l y ;
Listing 6. An example of the insufficient supply problem.
Moreover, in some cases, there might not exist initial supply at
all. Thus we cannot perform the validation shown in Fig. 5(b).
C. RQ3: The Impact of the Fake Deposit Vulnerability
We further measured the impact of the 7,735 influenced
tokens. As described in RQ1, 56 ERC-20 tokens are affected
by Type-I attack. The top-5 tokens (Type-I) with the highest
number of holders and transactions are shown in Table I
(Column 1-3). They have 258 holders and 1,178 transactions
in total. Although the overall volume of them is not large, ac-
cording to the validation methods we described in §IV-B, these
56 contracts can be attacked in the wild as long as the DEXes
allow these tokens to be traded and the depositToken is
used. Consequently, we have identified three such kinds of
DEXes, i.e., IDEX [20], DDEX [27], and Ether Delta [19].
IDEX and DDEX are still active with a relatively high trading
volume, around 1 million USD per day according to the
statistics from etherscan.io.
For the 7,716 tokens that are vulnerable to Type-II attack,
they are potentially at risk of being attacked in the scenario
of insufficient validation of CEXes. Table I shows the top-5
tokens with the highest market capitalization. Note that, here
we consider fully diluted market cap, which is calculated by
multiplying the token total supply with the current market
price per token. The data is acquired on 10th June from
etherscan.io. If we take all the tokens suffered from Type-
II attack into consideration, the market cap would be over
1 billion USD, and the number of holders and transactions
would be 695K and 4.6 million respectively. Therefore, if a
CEX allows these tokens to be traded without comprehensive
verification, the financial loss will be tremendous.
VI. DISCUSSION
Mitigation of Fake Deposit Vulnerability. For developers,
strictly following the official guideline [2] is always a good
choice. To be specific, developers should implement all the six
mandatory functions carefully, especially the transfer and
transferFrom that are closely related to the transferring
behaviors. The developer should throw an exception if any
mis-behavior happens (like insufficient balance or allowance)
in both of them instead of returning a boolean value. For
the DEX, as both of the transfer and transferFrom
will return a boolean value to indicate if the transferring
succeeds, the DEX should never assume the return value
from tokens. Additionally, it should handle the exception
properly if the token raises it. For the CEX, it should perform
a comprehensive verification on each transaction of deposit
request in back-end servers.
Limitation. We characterize the fake deposit vulnerability
mainly from the perspective of the ERC-20 smart contracts. As
we mentioned, performing the Type-II attack also requires the
flawed verification of CEXes. However, we are unable to get
the source code of CEXes. Thus, we only measure the scale
of the vulnerable ERC-20 tokens, which is an upper bound for
the Type-II attack. Besides, we did not analyze the transactions
on Ethereum, which may reveal the existence of real-world
fake deposit attacks. Furthermore, it was reported that the fake
deposit attacks have been observed in other blockchains (e.g.,
USDT [28], EOSIO [29]), while this paper only focused on
Ethereum. We leave them for the future work.
VII. RELATED WORK
Characterizing the Blockchain Ecosystem. A number of
studies have measured the blockchain ecosystem [30]–[35].
Chen et al. [35] characterized money transfer, contract creation
and invocation of Ethereum through graph analysis. Huang et
al. [30] characterized EOSIO blockchain, and [34] proposed
an approach to identify entities in Bitcoin blockchain.
Program Analysis of Smart Contract. Based on program
analysis techniques, e.g., symbolic execution and formal verifi-
cation, a variety of frameworks have been proposed to improve
the security of smart contracts [36]–[43]. Specifically, M.
Mossberg et al. [41] proposed Manticore, a dynamic symbolic
execution framework for analyzing Ethereum smart contract.
He et al. [43] implemented a symbolic execution framework
for analyzing smart contracts at WebAssembly level, which is
used by EOSIO blockchain.
ERC-20 Tokens. Several work [44]–[50] have focused on
the ERC-20 smart contracts in Ethereum. A number of stud-
ies [45], [46], [49] analyzed the network structures of tokens
and transactions in Ethereum. Chen et al. proposed Token-
Scope [50], which is able to detect transactions that triggers
inconsistent behaviors. Somin et al. [48] presents the analysis
of the dynamical properties of the ERC-20 protocol, which in
turn allows the prediction of some network parameters.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have systematically characterized the fake
deposit vulnerability in Ethereum. DEPOSafe, an automated
tool is proposed to perform the detection and verification of
the vulnerability. We demonstrate the efficiency of DEPOSafe
with experiments on a large number of smart contracts. Our
observations reveal the prevalence of fake deposit vulnerability
in the ERC-20 smart contracts. Our efforts can positively
contribute to bring developer awareness, attract the focus of
the research community and regulators, and promote best
operational practices across blockchains.
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